DNS Sinkhole
DNS Sinkhole
One-liner: A defensive technique that redirects DNS queries for malicious domains to a controlled IP address, preventing connections to attacker infrastructure.
π― What Is It?
DNS Sinkhole is a security mechanism that intercepts and redirects DNS requests for known malicious domains to a safe IP address (typically 0.0.0.0, 127.0.0.1, or a dedicated sinkhole server). When a user or infected system tries to resolve a malicious domain, the DNS server returns the sinkhole IP instead of the actual malicious server's address, effectively blocking the connection.
π€ Why It Matters
- Prevents Command and Control (C2) β Stops malware from communicating with attacker servers
- Blocks malware downloads β Prevents initial infection or additional payload retrieval
- Protects against Phishing β Blocks access to phishing websites
- Enables detection β Sinkhole queries provide IOCs for investigation
- Zero-day protection β Works even against unknown malware using known bad domains
π¬ How It Works
Basic Flow
1. User/Malware queries: malicious-c2.evil.com
2. Internal DNS server checks blocklist
3. Domain matches blocklist entry
4. DNS returns: 0.0.0.0 (sinkhole IP)
5. Connection attempt fails or goes to sinkhole server
6. Event logged for investigation
Common Sinkhole IPs
| IP Address | Purpose |
|---|---|
0.0.0.0 |
Null route (connection fails immediately) |
127.0.0.1 |
Localhost (connection loops back) |
192.168.x.x |
Internal sinkhole server (logs connections) |
| Dedicated IP | Sinkhole server for analysis |
Implementation Methods
1. DNS Server Configuration
- Bind/Unbound: RPZ (Response Policy Zones)
- Windows DNS: Conditional forwarding or zone redirect
- Pi-hole: Domain blocklist
2. DNS Firewall / RPZ
; Response Policy Zone example
evil-c2.com CNAME . ; Null response
malware.net A 0.0.0.0 ; Sinkhole IP
3. Enterprise DNS Security
- Cisco Umbrella
- Infoblox DNS Firewall
- Akamai ETP
π‘οΈ Detection & Prevention
How to Detect Sinkholed Connections
Using SIEM or log analysis:
# Kibana/Elastic Query
dns.resolved_ip: "0.0.0.0" OR dns.resolved_ip: "127.0.0.1"
# Splunk Query
index=dns dns_answer="0.0.0.0" OR dns_answer="127.0.0.1"
| stats count by src_ip, query
| sort - count
Indicators to Monitor
- High volume of queries to sinkhole IP from single host β Infected system
- Repeated queries to same sinkholed domain β Persistent malware
- Queries to newly sinkholed domains β Recent compromise
Sigma Rule Example
title: DNS Query to Sinkholed Domain
logsource:
category: dns
detection:
selection:
dns.resolved_ip:
- '0.0.0.0'
- '127.0.0.1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate services using localhost
level: medium
βοΈ Offensive Evasion Techniques
Attackers try to bypass DNS sinkholing:
- Hard-coded IPs β Bypass DNS entirely
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH) β Encrypted DNS to public resolvers
- Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) β Generate thousands of domains (only few need to work)
- Fast Flux β Rapidly change DNS responses
- Custom DNS resolvers β Use attacker-controlled DNS
- IP-based C2 β Direct IP connections
π€ Interview Angles
Common Questions
- "What is a DNS sinkhole and how does it work?"
- "How would you detect a sinkholed connection in logs?"
- "What are the limitations of DNS sinkholing?"
- "How do attackers bypass DNS sinkholing?"
Key Talking Points
- Sinkholing is reactive β requires known bad domains
- Works best with threat intelligence feeds
- Combine with DNS logging for investigation
- DoH/DoT bypass traditional sinkholing (need TLS inspection)
- Effective first layer of defense, not complete solution
STAR Story
Situation: SIEM showed 115 hits to domains resolving to
0.0.0.0from 12 unique hosts.
Task: Investigate potential malware infections indicated by DNS sinkhole.
Action: Queried DNS logs for all queries resolving to sinkhole IP. Identified 12 malicious domains and 7 infected hosts. Cross-referenced with threat intelligence feedsβdomains linked to known Malware campaign. Isolated affected hosts, ran EDR scans, found trojan banking malware. Deployed updated IOCs to firewall.
Result: Contained infection to 7 hosts before data exfiltration. Blocked malware C2 for entire network via DNS sinkhole. Updated incident response playbook with sinkhole monitoring procedures.
β Best Practices
- Maintain up-to-date malicious domain feeds
- Use dedicated sinkhole server (not
0.0.0.0) for better logging - Alert on sinkhole hits for immediate investigation
- Combine with Firewall IP blocking for defense-in-depth
- Monitor for DoH/DoT traffic bypassing internal DNS
- Log all DNS queries for forensics
- Regularly review and update blocklists
β Common Misconceptions
- "Sinkholing stops all malware" β Only works if malware uses DNS
- "Sinkhole = blocking" β Sinkholing redirects; blocking would be DNS filtering
- "
0.0.0.0is the only sinkhole IP" β Can use any IP;0.0.0.0is just common - "Set and forget" β Requires continuous feed updates and monitoring
π Related Concepts
- Domain Name System (DNS)
- DNS Tunneling
- Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)
- Fast Flux
- Command and Control (C2)
- Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)
- Indicator of Compromise (IOC)
- Security Information and Event Management system (SIEM)
π References
- SANS: DNS Sinkhole as a Defensive Weapon
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS)
- Spamhaus Domain Block List (DBL)
- abuse.ch URLhaus feed